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ESTATE AND GIFT TAX REFORM:
A COMPENDIUM OF THOUGHT
by
Jack M. Kinnebrew*
O UR present dual transfer tax system produces only slightly more
revenue than does the tax on cigarettes.' Revenues from estate and
gift taxes have continually declined as a proportion of the total revenue
raised by the federal government. Prior to World War II, seven per cent
of federal revenues came from estate and gift taxes.' Today, their share
is less than two per cent.' As early as 1950, the low yield of federal estate
and gift taxes was attributed to "excessive exemptions, unduly low effec-
tive rates on most estates, and the fact that the law as written favors large
estates over smaller ones, and leaves substantial amounts of wealth com-
pletely beyond the reach of the tax laws."' In addition, few estate and gift
tax returns are even filed. Contrasted with the sixty million taxable in-
come tax returns filed annually are the eighty thousand taxable estate
and gift tax returns.'
The federal estate tax law and the federal gift tax law, as we know
them, have been in effect for more than fifty and thirty-five years, respec-
tively." The main outline of neither law has changed since its adoption, and
the last change in rates was to the gift tax in 1940.! Because of the impact
which estate and gift taxation has assumed over the years, it has been
suggested that drastic changes in these areas should be infrequent and
adopted only in response to a real need, and after careful consideration.8
However, with the cry of tax reform in the air, heightened by the pas-
sage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,' it is inevitable that a re-examination
of the entire federal estate and gift tax structure will be made.
In February of 1969, the Treasury Department published its tax reform
studies and proposals relating to revision of the federal estate and gift tax
laws." Hearings on these proposals were conducted by the House Ways
and Means Committee at the same time hearings were conducted on the
income tax reform proposals, many of which were enacted in the Tax
* B.B.A., University of Oklahoma; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
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Reform Act of 1969. In 1968, the American Law Institute completed its
Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, which studied for over five years the
problems inherent in the system under direction of the Reporter, A. James
Casner." The Treasury proposals submitted to the House Ways and Means
Committee in early 1969 "drew heavily on the work of the American Law
Institute's Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project."1 Most of the commenta-
tors and proponents of estate and gift tax reform in the United States have
considered a reformation of the existing system rather than a switch to
taxing receipts entirely as income. The Canadians, on the other hand, have
recommended that transfers of property by death or by gift be treated
as income to the recipients and thereby do away with the general con-
cept of estate and gift transfer taxes altogether."1
As expected, there is heated controversy over many of the proposals
now before Congress. However, before these proposals are explored in
detail, it seems appropriate to quote from an article written in jest and
expressing, hopefully, unwarranted fears: "There has been a disquieting
number of letters suggesting that reform in the tax field is a dangerous
monster, that reform almost always turns out to be retrogression and that
in any case reform in taxation is invariably incomprehensible."14 I trust
that this Article will be not only comprehensible, but also enlightening.
I. AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
AND THE REFORM PROPOSALS
A. Estate and Gift Taxation
Development. The present federal estate tax dates from 1916, and it
has remained unchanged in principle from that date." The maximum rate
was initially ten per cent on estates with property in excess of $5 million,
and the rates were soon increased to a maximum of twenty-five per cent
on estates in excess of $10 million in order to raise money for military
expenditures. The net estate was determined by deducting from the gross
estate a $50 thousand exemption and deductions for certain expenses, taxes,
and losses." However, there were no deductions similar to the present
charitable and marital deductions.'" Originally, the federal estate tax con-
sisted of a "basic estate tax" with a specific exemption of $100 thousand
"
1 AMERICAN LAW INsTITuTE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1969) [hereinafter cited
as ALI PROJECT].
'2 Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARv. L. REv. 986, 987 n.6
(1970).
123 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION ch. 17 (1966).
14 Blum & Pedrick, Estate and Gift Tax Retackled, A Progress Report on the ALIJ, 44 TAXES
737, 743 (1966).
11 The first federal death tax was actually a stamp tax on receipt of legacies and intestate
shares of personal property. It was in effect for only four years, from 1798 to 1802. There were
additional inheritance or estate taxes in effect during the Civil War period, during 1894, and during
the Spanish-American War. Casner, American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project,
22 TAX L. REV. 515, 518-19 (1967).
16 1d. at 519.
17 These deductions were generally of the same character as those presently allowed in INT. REv.
CODE of 1954, §§ 2053, 2054.
'aSee Casner, supra note 15, at 520.
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and an "additional estate tax" with a specific exemption of $60 thousand.
This dichotomy was kept in the law in order to keep the eighty per cent
credit which was allowed to the states from applying to other than the
"basic estate tax."' 9 In order to simplify computations, the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code combined the basic and additional taxes into a single rate
schedule and changed the state death tax credit to a percentage based on
a corresponding percentage schedule."0
The first federal gift tax was imposed in 1924, but repealed in 1926.1
The present gift tax dates from 1932, and has not changed its basic struc-
ture since that time. This revenue act provided for a $50 thousand specific
exemption and a $5 thousand annual exclusion per donee (other than
future interests in property), and these amounts were reduced to the pres-
ent $30 thousand specific exemption and $3 thousand annual exclusion in
1943.2 From the very beginning, the gift tax rates were three-fourths of
the prevailing estate tax rates, and this ratio has remained constant with
increases in the rates.
The Revenue Act of 19485 attempted to equalize the tax treatment of
spouses in common law states with those in community property states.
It produced both the estate tax marital deduction and the gift tax marital
deduction which exist now.'
Revenues from the federal estate tax reached a high in the early years
of $154 million for the fiscal year 1921, after which they declined until
the middle depression years, reaching a pre-World War II level of $382
million for 1938.' After World War II, a temporary high of $822 million
was reached in 1948, prior to introduction of the marital deduction in
the Revenue Act of 1948, and then revenues rose from $1.2 billion in
1958 to approximately $3.1 billion in fiscal year 1969.2"
Gift tax collections have likewise varied significantly over the years,
reaching a high of $160 million in 1936, which was not reached again
until recent years. Gift tax revenues rose gradually from $134 million for
1958 to approximately $393 million for the fiscal year 1969.8,
Function. The estate tax, as commonly believed, is dominated by a single
purpose-the confiscation of excessive accumulations of wealth. ' In the
early 1950's Congressman Kean re-echoed these notions when he stated:
"I favor them [estate taxes] entirely on the basis of the social benefits in
19 Id.
20Id. The $60,000 exemption presently in the law for the additional estate tax began as a
$50,000 exemption in 1932, was reduced to $40,000 in 1935, and was increased to its present
amount in 1942. Id. at 520-21.
21 Id. at 529.
2 Id.
23Act of Apr. 2d 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 110.241INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S§ 2056, 2523.
8 Casner, supra note 15, at 531.
26 Id. at 531-32; U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Annual Report of the Com-
missioner 99 (1969). See also Westfall, supra note 12, at 986.
'Casner, supra note 15, at 532; U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Annual Re-
port of the Commissioner 99 (1969). See also Westfall, supra note 12, at 986.
'
8 Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAx L. REv. 223, at 224 (1956).
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preventing the piling up of too big estates." ' To achieve this goal, the tax
can hardly avoid gathering some revenue in the process. But, according
to traditional justification, the performance of the estate tax is not to
be judged by the size of its fiscal haul. This understanding of the estate
tax function usually satisfies its proponents, as well as its opponents.
The fact is, however, that the historical discussion presented above shows
clearly that death taxes in the United States were devised to produce
revenue.
Surprisingly, the leveling of hereditary fortunes as a function of the
estate tax was not formally approved as one of its objectives until the
Franklin Roosevelt administration."5 After the mid-1930's, however, rates
drastically declined, and, based on historical analysis, Eisenstein concluded
that the social objective of the estate tax to level inheritances was promi-
nent only in 1934 and 1935, and his overall conclusion was that the estate
tax had been primarily imposed for revenue." Eisenstein discussed this
social objective of the estate tax in the context of "how much the heirs
should keep."' This, of course, raises the difficult question of how large is
too large and when has a too-large estate been adequately reduced.' Thus,
while it is easy to state this social objective, it is much more difficult to
ascertain mathematical guidelines consistent with general concepts of
equity."
Shoup, in his book Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, identifies three chief
aims of taxation of gifts and transfers at death: (1) taxation of windfalls,
(2) taxation of property once a generation, and (3) taxation to reduce
concentration." Shoup takes the traditional view that achieving certain
social consequences is among the primary aims of the federal estate tax.
His analysis is somewhat unique. With respect to taxation of windfalls,
he recognizes that it is not only the recipient who is affected, but also the
transferor, who will suffer some "psychic injury from announcement of
" Hearings Before the Honse Comm. on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of 1950, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1950).
"°Eisenstein, supra note 28, at 225.
"1 President Roosevelt boldly stated that progressive death taxes as a means of regulating wealth
were justified because: "The transmission from generation to generation of vast fortunes by will,
inheritance, or gift is not consistent with the ideals and sentiments of the American people." H.R.
REP. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935).
m Eisenstein, supra note 28, at 237-38.
ald. at 252.
" Both Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt discussed this problem. Theodore Roosevelt advocated
a "heavy progressive tax" on all fortunes "beyond a certain amount," so that only that certain
amount would pass "to any one individual." 18 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 578 (Memorial
ed. 1925). Somewhat more helpful, though not unambiguous, Franklin Roosevelt contrasted "for-
tunes" and "accumulations" which are "great" and "vast" with a "reasonable inheritance" which
adequately serves to "provide security for one's self and one's family." H.R. REP. No. 1681,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). Herbert Hoover believed that moderate inheritances in the neigh-
borhood of $100,000 were a reasonable provision for dependents. He felt that "[sjeveral millions
of dollars is economic power and too often it falls into the hands of persons of little intention
to use that power for public benefit either in expansion of enterprise or employment of public
services. It is the breeding ground of playboys and playgirls of morally obnoxious and degenerating
character." 3 THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER 136 (1952).
" While nothing has been mentioned concerning equity, it is implicit in all of the major aims
discussed. Beyond that, equity requires that a tax should not strike capriciously but should take




a prospective tax on that transfer, and his conduct may be altered by the
tax.""7 He also considers taxation of property once a generation to be one
of the chief aims, although this appears to be a subsidiary goal under the
general aim of taxation to reduce concentration. Lastly, he recognizes that
taxing to reduce concentration is best accomplished by some form of
death tax.
Prior to consideration of any reform proposals, the Reporter of the
American Law Institute Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, A. James
Casner, considered as threshold questions the objectives which tax legisla-
tion in this field should be designed to accomplish.' He considered raising
revenue a relevant, though not necessarily controlling, consideration in
weighing reform proposals. He also stated that since transfer taxes usually
have a significant impact in cases in which they apply, a system had to be
basically fair in its conception and application. Finally, he recognized that
the frequently-stated, major purpose of a transfer tax is to prevent accum-
ulated wealth from being passed on to persons who did not accumulate it.
While refraining from expressing any opinion on whether this is a major
purpose of such a tax, he recognized that it is an inherent end result.
Consistent with this goal of thorough examination, the pros and cons
of the material estate and gift tax reform proposals will be discussed in
this Article. A taxpayer favorably affected is using public money, and
society, through the government, has a right to know that an indirect
subsidy by tax reduction or otherwise is indeed being used for public
purposes.
B. The Reform Proposals
Prior to the completion of the American Law Institute's Estate and
Gift Tax Project in 1968, there had been a wealth of studies and reform
proposals in existence.' For the most part, these earlier efforts serve to put
the American Law Institute Project and the Treasury recommendations
in historical perspective, for the ideas and proposals developed during the
earlier years have made it possible for the recent studies and proposals to
be more sophisticated, and yet still workable.
The American Law Institute's Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project origi-
nated in order to contribute to the improvement of the presently existing
transfer tax systems."1 The Institute's conclusions are expressed in forty-
five recommendations for improvements in the law, embodied in resolu-
tions adopted at the annual meeting in May of 1968. These recommenda-
7Id. at 101.
"aCasner, supra note 15, at 517-18.
"' See Boehm, Cause and Effect: Federal Estate Tax Revision Tied by Law to Social Conse-
quences, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 479 (1965).
°See, e.g., U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GI'r TAXES: A PROPOSAL FOR IN-
TEGRATION AND FOR CORRELATION WITH THE INCOME TAX (1947); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
THE ECONOMIC REPORT, 84TH CONG., IST SESS., FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND STABILITY (Comm. Print 1955); Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); C. SHOUP, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXES (1966).
"'Williams, The American Law Institute's Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project, N.Y.U. 25TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1395 (1967).
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tions and the studies published with them are the product of more than
five years of study of federal estate and gifts taxation by the Reporter, Pro-
fessor A. James Casner of the Harvard Law School, and a distinguished
group of consultants and advisors drawn from the leading specialists in this
important field. It is only the official recommendations that speak for the
Institute. While forty-five recommendations for improvements were
adopted by the members, the resulting document could only be presented
to the public and could not be recommended in an attempt "to influence
legislation. '
The Project developed three alternative "model" transfer tax systems:
the dual transfer tax system, the single transfer tax system, and the ac-
cessions tax system. The model dual transfer tax system attempted to re-
vise and improve the present separate estate and gift tax structures by
incorporating into them many of the features of the model single transfer
tax system. Accordingly, the many minor refinements in the present dual
transfer tax system will not be discussed. Also, it should be noted that the
Treasury has proposed a unified system for taxing both lifetime gifts and
transfers at death," making discussion of minor improvements to the pres-
ent dual transfer tax system unnecessary.
Second, a model single transfer tax system was developed under which
a single set of exemptions and a single rate schedule would be applicable
to both lifetime and death time transfers. The total lifetime transfers (and
any unused exemption) would be taken into account in determining the
tax rate on property passing at death. Under such a system, much of the
complexity of determining whether lifetime transfers are also taxed as
death transfers (with credit for any gift tax paid) could be eliminated."
The Reporter and personnel of the Project assumed that the model single
transfer tax system would be adopted and they tried to develop the simpl-
est, most equitable, and most workable system possible.
Third, the Project developed a model accessions tax system which based
the amount of tax on the total value of all property gratuitously received
by the transferee. Many people believe that, conceptually, this would be
the fairest and most equitable transfer system of all,' although in the
words of Professor Casner: "The Institute was not invited to consider the
accessions tax system, in the view that a change to such a system is not
now a feasible alternative."'
It was the overriding purpose of the Project to make certain major
structural changes applicable to all of the model systems so that an in-
formed judgment could be made as to which transfer tax system was best
for the United States." As noted earlier,' the far-reaching revisions de-
veloped by the Treasury drew heavily on the American Law Institute's
4' Id. at 1400. This inability "to influence legislation" stems from the Institute's status as a tax
exempt organization. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 501 (c) (3).
4 
TREAS. PROPOSALS 6.
4 See Williams, supra note 41, at 1401-02.
45Id. at 1402.
4ALI PROJECT 4.
4 See Williams, supra note 41, at 1402-03.
48 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Federal Estate and Gift Tax Project. Professor Casner recently stated
that tax reform is still very much in the air and that we have been prom-
ised in the near future a reform package in the estate and gift tax area.'
He notes that the "reform package will rest somewhat heavily on the final
report of the American Law Institute's Estate and Gift Tax Project .... .""
These comments and the general clamor for reform indicate that it is
likely that estate and gift tax reform will take place, if not this year, then
certainly during 1971. 5'
II. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS
A. Unification of Estate and Gift Taxes
Arguments For. The present dual system of estate and gift taxation pro-
vides impressive tax savings for large estates. For a married couple with
$5 million, lifetime gifts of one-half of their property produce a tax sav-
ing over testamentary transfer of all assets of about thirty-nine per cent,
reducing the total tax burden $758 thousand. If the married couple had
$10 million, the tax saving resulting from giving one-half away during
life is approximately forty-four per cent, reducing the tax burden by over
$2 million." This brief description of the effect of the dual system gives
rise to several arguments in favor of establishing the unified transfer tax
in its place. Shoup has stated the case for unification in the negative by
declaring: "The present lack of integration has scarcely anything to be
said for it, except that to make a change would be costly."" The present
dual estate and gift tax schedules would be replaced by a unified transfer
tax schedule applicable to both lifetime and death time transfers under
which the initial bracket for death time transfers would be established by
the total lifetime gifts."
As suggested in the above example, the greatest argument for unifying
the transfer taxes is to remove the present bias for lifetime gifts over
testamentary dispositions. First, the most obvious factor in the bias is that
the gift tax rates are only seventy-five per cent of the estate tax rates.'
Second, there exist separate rate schedules for the estate and gift tax.
Since total transfers can be divided so that a portion is subject to the
estate tax and a portion to the gift tax, the advantage of starting each of
4l A. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING iii (3d ed. Supp. 1970).
50 Id.
5 In September of 1969, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Edwin S. Cohen, indicated in a
speech that the administration would press for more tax reform in 1970. Among the items men-
tioned by Cohen was improvement of the estate and gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code. Berkowitz, Estate and Gift Tax Reform, an Overview, 109 TRUSTS & ESTATES 12 (1970).
In October of 1969, Mr. Cohen's assistant, John S. Nolan, stressed the importance of the estate and
gift tax reform in the administration's future tax plans. Id. Most recently, in May of 1970, the
Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service stated that Congress is likely to give priority to
proposals to revise federal estate and gift tax laws, either late this year or in early 1971. Revision
Seen for Estate, Gift Tax Laws, 33 TEx. B.J. 440 (1970).
52 Tax Reform Hearings 403 5.
53 C. SHoup, supra note 1, at 111.
"4 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 641-42.
55 See Kurtz, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Changes, Some Arguments in Favor of Treasury's
Proposals, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 458, 460 (1969).
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the transfers at the lowest rate is obtained." In other words, the property
which is the subject of a lifetime gift comes off the top estate tax bracket
while being taxed at the prevailing gift tax bracket. Because exemptions
exist both for lifetime transfers and for testamentary dispositions, this
movement of property from the highest estate tax bracket to the lowest
gift tax bracket is especially effective to reduce taxes. Third, the gift tax
rates apply only to the net amount of the gift, so that the amount of the
gift tax is not subject to tax; the estate tax, however, is levied on the full
value of the estate, which includes whatever amount is needed to pay the
tax.2 For example, if a decedent leaves an estate of $10 million to a child,
the estate tax would be about $6 million, leaving about $4 million for the
child. If, on the other hand, the same taxpayer decided to give the property
to his child during his lifetime, he could make a gift of approximately
$6-1/2 million on which a gift tax of about $3-1/2 million would be paid
(after adjusting for the difference in estate and gift tax rates). By trans-
ferring his property during lifetime, the taxpayer would increase the net
amount given to his child from $4 million to $6-1/2 million, an increase
of over sixty per cent." The estate tax is withheld on the total amount
transferred in much the same manner as the income tax is withheld on
wages paid, in contrast to the gift tax which is paid only on the net amount
of the transfer. If the goal were to collect the same amount of revenue
under the unified tax system as presently collected under the dual tax
system, the estate tax rates, which would serve as the single rate structure,
could be reduced substantially."
The lack of "neutrality" under the dual transfer tax system operates as
a powerful pressure on the taxpayer to make particular family dispositions,
even though an entirely different disposition might be desired for non-tax
reasons." In order to reduce taxes, some persons may have made transfers
which they would not have otherwise made." However, the importance of
lifetime transfers is much less under a unified transfer tax system since the
value of the property will be included in the same rate structure, and
thus distinctions between the two could be simplified and made definite to
avoid overlapping treatment." Completed lifetime transfers would be
found in as many cases as is reasonably possible. In this way, the difficult
and occasional arbitrariness of treatment, which is inevitable in drawing
a line between lifetime and death time transfers, is minimized. Whether a
particular transfer is a lifetime or death time transfer would not materially
alter the total tax.
56 Id.
57 See TREAS. PROPOSALS 30.
"See Kurtz, supra note 55, at 460.
"Alexander, supra note 6, at 642.
60 See TREAS. PROPOSALS 116. It should be noted that in listing the advantages of a unified
transfer tax system, the disadvantages of a dual transfer tax system provide the compelling reasons
for the change, and, hence, they are listed here as arguments in favor of the proposed unified system.
" See A.L.I. Recommendations on Estate and Gift Taxation, 3 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &
TRUST J. 111, 124-25 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ALl Recommendations].
" See Alexander, supra note 6, at 645.
'a Id. at 646.
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Under the present system, a decision to impose a tax on a lifetime trans-
fer does not necessarily mean that the transferred property will escape the
estate tax on the donor's death, even though present law, to a limited
extent, allows a credit against the estate tax for the gift tax paid."4 The
lifetime transfer may be subject to estate taxation because it is a gift in
contemplation of death ;6 because the donor retained the right to benefits
for his life; 6 because the donor retained certain powers over the transferred
property;"7 because the transfer was to take effect at the donor's death;"
or because the transfer resulted in a joint ownership with right of survivor-
ship between the donor and another.6 Simplification in this area would be
a welcomed improvement in the transfer tax system.
Arguments Against. Opponents of the unified transfer tax argue that
the Government should encourage lifetime giving, and that, of course, is
what the dual tax structure is intended to do."' One of the arguments often
made is that this is socially desirable because property will be transferred
into the hands of younger persons who take greater risks.' That
argument may be somewhat less than sound in the cases of transfers in
trust, since fiduciaries are required by law to invest conservatively. Even
assuming gifts should be favored because they put capital into the hands
of younger people, one author raises the question of why the present system
should be retained when it, in practice, encourages gifts by the very
wealthy to a much greater extent than gifts by the less wealthy."
Some opponents of the unified transfer tax have expressed concern that
a taxpayer making lifetime transfers under a unified tax system would be
exposed to a greater risk of financial injury when there is a subsequent
decrease in the value of his remaining assets." The problem is illustrated
by the case of a decedent who, having made substantial lifetime transfers
and retaining what he considers to be an adequate estate, finds that the
value of his retained estate has decreased materially at the date of his death
to a point where he is not able to provide for the bequests he intended to
make. Nevertheless, under the unified system, the beginning bracket into
which his estate falls will be the same as if there had been no decline in
value.' Of course, to the extent that the estate passes to a surviving spouse
and a free interspousal rule were adopted as proposed, the problem would
not be present.
A related risk of a unified system is the prejudice resulting to a taxpayer
from a subsequent increase in tax rates, to be applied to his death time
64INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, S 2012.
0 id. 5 2035.Id. 5 2036.
61 Id. 55 2036, 2038.
68 Id. 5 2037.
69 Id. 5 2040.
"' See ALI Recommendations 125.
" Kramer, The Federal Estate and Gift Tax Laws-Reforms for Modernization, in THE TAX-
PAYERS' STAKE IN TAX REFORM 10 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1968).
" See Kurtz, supra note 55, at 460.
"'ALI Recommendations 126.
"4 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 647.
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transfers, which would be more than his estate (or the beneficiaries) could
afford. Under the dual system, property passing by testamentary dis-
position always starts at the lowest tax bracket."
The unified tax system would place a heavy burden on executors to
investigate lifetime transfers in order to determine the decedent's estate
tax brackets. This problem would exist in all estates." However, certain
limitations of liability for the executor-fiduciary could be built into this
system. For example, lack of knowledge of lifetime transfers and their
extent, if any, could be established by request that gift tax returns be
furnished the fiduciary by the Internal Revenue Service." Additional bur-
dens would be placed on the Government, and fiduciaries would have to
be educated, but the problem does not seem insurmountable.
Another objection to adoption of a unified system is that it would cre-
ate such a basic change in the tax structure as to require a re-examination
of most, if not all, existing estate plans." Collateral to this is the problem
of re-educating the public, government officials, and experts in the new
law. However, this objection could be raised to many of the proposed
estate and gift tax reforms. It might be said, therefore, that if we are to
have reform, then the reconsidering of estate plans and re-educating of
personnel is part of the price we have to pay for greater equity in the
system. In any event, it appears that disruption of existing estate plans
can be avoided only by keeping the present dual system without important
structural revision."
There is one final objection to the adoption of a unified system. Since the
present dual tax structure has not greatly encouraged lifetime giving,
aren't we making "much ado about nothing" in advocating a major over-
haul to correct a theoretical, yet littled used, abuse or inequity? Most trust
officers and lawyers state that regardless of the incentive produced by tax
savings, most people are reluctant to actually give property away during
their lifetime."0 Shoup stated in his book: "In fact, however, wealth trans-
ferors do not use this escape route as much as might be expected." 1 The
fact that surprisingly few individuals avail themselves of the tax savings
of lifetime giving raises interesting questions.'
Schwartz and Aronson in their article quote Joseph Pechman as sug-
gesting four non-economic reasons that discourage people from making
gifts in spite of the potential tax saving:
(1) The reluctance on the part of most people to contemplate death;
(2) The desire to maintain control over business operations;
7 "See ALl Recommendations 126.
7' Alexander, supra note 6, at 647.
" ALl Recommendations 127.
7' See Alexander, supra note 6, at 648.
"Id.
go See Kramer, supra note 71, at 10.
81 C. SHoup, supra note 1, at 127.
" For thorough and well-written articles on the motivation, or lack thereof, for lifetime giving,
see Hochman & Lindsay, Taxation, Interest and the Timing of Inter-Generation Wealth Transfers,
20 NAT'L TAX J. 219 (1967); Schwartz & Aronson, The Preference for Accumulation Vs. Spend-
ing: Gift and Estate Taxation, and the Timing of Wealth Transfers, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 390 (1969).
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(3) The wish to delay property transfers until children have had an
opportunity to make their own careers; and
(4) The fact that many people simply do not know the law."
Despite these common beliefs, Schwartz and Aronson suggest there is a
perfectly valid economic rationale for most individuals' reluctance to
make gifts. These authors discern that there are individual preferences
for spending over savings and vice versa, with varying shades in between,
and this, coupled with time discounting, can be used to establish economic
models from which conclusions can be drawn. The authors then compare,
through complex formulas, a case involving a "spender" with a million
dollars of present holdings who does not wish to decrease the million dollar
corpus and an "accumulator" whose desire is to transfer a maximum
amount of wealth. In these examples, since time discounting is involved, the
age of the donor or decedent is also important. The authors conclude on a
rational basis under the factors given, that the spender should transfer his
wealth through his estate, and the accumulator should pass his wealth by
gift. However, even these conclusions change, depending upon the age of
the holder of the wealth. However, the authors contend that "[a] rational
decision is determinable when the factors are given. ' ' "4 The authors con-
clude:
The presumed tax advantage of the gift diminishes when reasonable assump-
tions are made about the utility of the spending stream compared to the
utility of wealth transfers .... Only when there is strong desire to transfer
a maximum fund is there an immediate advantage to making a gift (prob-
ably in trust). It now seems clear that there are economic as well as non-
economic reasons to explain the mystery as to why so many more funds pass
through the estate tax rather than through the lower gift tax."
The question might again be asked: Is the unified tax system really
necessary to plug this "loophole" for lifetime gifts? If other reform pro-
posals would not require reconsideration of existing estate plans, it might
be argued that the change is simply not worth it. However, in light of the
far-reaching reform proposals presently being considered, requiring re-
consideration in any event, a switch to a unified tax system may well be
justified.
American Law Institute Proposal. In the model unified transfer tax sys-
tem, an exemption of $100 thousand was recommended." Surprisingly,
however, there is no American Law Institute recommendation on the
choice between a dual tax system and a unified tax system. Because of
the complexity of the problem, the time required for its thorough explora-
tion, and, perhaps most importantly, the improbability of reaching any
clear consensus, a resolution for approval was not proposed.
Casner noted that there would be little or no support for a change to a
83 Schwartz & Aronson, supra note 82, at 391, quoting J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY
189-91 (1966).
4 Schwartz & Aronson, supra note 82, at 395.
Mid. at 398.
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unified tax if it were to be used to produce more revenue than presently
collectible under the dual tax system." He stated that some people even
base their opposition to unification on the conviction that the greater
revenue-raising potential of the unified tax would inevitably be exploited.
The position of the Institute was articulated in Recommendation 45:
Inasmuch as the primary justification for changing to a unified tax system
is to keep the rates on death time transfers for those who do not or cannot
make lifetime transfers at a lower rate than would be possible under a dual
tax system, it should be understood by those charged with determining the
rate structure, if a unified tax is adopted, that the purpose of the shift to a
unified tax would be undermined if the rate structure evolved under it were
designed to produce more revenue than would be produced under a dual tax
system.88
Treasury Proposal. The Treasury has proposed full unification of estate
and gift taxes into a single transfer tax to accomplish the dual objectives
of fairness and reduced complexity.' Under the unified tax, lifetime gifts
and transfers at death would be added together to determine the total
wealth subject to transfer taxation. A single exemption of $60 thousand
and a single rate schedule would be made applicable to that total, and
the base of the gift tax would be increased to include the amount of tax,
parallel to the treatment for estate taxes. In addition, the Treasury pro-
poses that the annual gift tax exclusion of $3 thousand per donee be con-
tinued.
B. Rate Reduction and Revision
Arguments For. Kramer has stated that whenever you mention tax re-
form of a progressive tax system, you inevitably raise the question of the
rate structure."8 Another commentator believes that revising the rate
schedule is central to any "reform" of present estate and gift taxation. 1
The present rate schedules telescope an enormous amount of progression
into the lower tax brackets, after which they level off and progress very
slowly, but continue to very high brackets. The lowest bracket of the
estate tax rate is three per cent, but this rate applies to only the first $ 5
thousand of the taxable estate."' Although the rates progress from three
per cent at the lowest bracket to seventy-seven per cent for taxable estates
over $10 million, the marginal rate of thirty per cent applies at a taxable
estate of $100 thousand." This steep progression is hardly defensible.
Casner stated in the American Law Institute Estate and Gift Tax Project
that the present estate and gift tax rate schedules were both strongly re-
jected because of the sharp progression at the lower levels. 4
81 ld. at 57.
8 Id. For a strong appeal that just such additional revenue-raising use should be made of the
unified tax system, see Westfall, supra note 12, at 986.
8 TREAS. PROPOSALs 31-32.
85 Kramer, supra note 71, at 12.
"'Williams, supra note 41, at 1403.
"INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, S 2001.
93 Id.
94 ALI PROJEcT 83.
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The matter of the exemption seems not to have been much debated.
Apparently, administrative considerations for removing from the tax rolls
smaller estates is a major factor in keeping some sort of exemption.
Arguments Against. No arguments have been made which object to the
levelling of the progression at the lower end of the estate and gift tax
rate schedules. Westfall, consistent with his theory that the estate tax
revenues need to be greatly increased to achieve certain social changes,
apparently feels that rates should start at the same level as those of the
income tax and progress to a top bracket at a level substantially below
$10 million." Shoup suggests that the starting rate should be ten or fifteen
per cent, with no need to reduce the seventy-seven per cent top bracket
rate."
American Law Institute Proposal. The American Law Institute recom-
mended that a $100 thousand exemption be used under the unified transfer
tax with a rate schedule beginning at three per cent for the first bracket of
$50 thousand, seven per cent for the second bracket, also $50 thousand,
and progressing to a rate of sixty per cent on transfers in excess of $6
million."
Treasury Proposal. The Treasury Department has recommended a re-
duction in the rates of the unified transfer tax." The top estate tax bracket,
now at seventy-seven per cent, would be reduced to sixty-five per cent
on taxable estates over $10 million. Other tax brackets would be reduced
by about twenty per cent, except for the lowest bracket of three per cent.
There would be a transitional period for this reduction in rate which would
be completed in ten years.
The Treasury proposed that the $60 thousand exemption be retained for
use in the unified transfer tax system and that the present $3 thousand
annual exclusion per donee for gifts be retained.
C. Tax-Free Transfers Between Husband and Wife
Arguments For. The fifty per cent marital deduction" in the estate and
gift tax laws has been with us since 1948. It was originally adopted in an
effort to bring greater equality between non-community and community
property states. Since community property is divided on a fifty-fifty basis
between husband and wife, the marital deduction is limited to about fifty
per cent of the donor-spouse's estate. The so-called terminable-interest rule
requires the donee-spouse to receive an interest somewhat equivalent to
outright ownership in order for the transfer to qualify for the marital
deduction,00 and because of this rule, technical requirements to qualify an
95 Westfall, supra note 12, at 990.
9C. SHOUP, supra note 1, at 116.
07ALl PROJECT 83-85.
o8TREAS. PROPOSALS 44. See also Andresen, Gift and Estate Tax Reform Proposals, 108 TRUSTS
& ESTATES 664, 670 (1969).
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interest other than by outright ownership are complex.'' In summary, the
fifty per cent marital deduction permits the decedent to pass as much as
one-half of his estate to his surviving spouse without any estate tax im-
posed on the transfer.'
Williams has described the sweeping changes proposed as accepting, for
tax purposes, the common view that property of the husband or wife
is "our property" without regard to the legalistic niceties of title holding,
and they would take spouses out of the bookkeeping business inter sese to
the extent they chose."7 Casner agrees that a more realistic tax concept in
this area may be that of recognizing the belief of the average husband
and wife who refer to "our property" without regard to the technical
aspects of legal ownership.'"
Although the fifty per cent marital deduction provision was designed
to achieve complete equality between common law and community prop-
erty states, it simply has not done so in many important areas."5 In addi-
tion, it forces spouses into an unnatural record-keeping of inter-spousal
transfers which is inconsistent with the "our" concept of property.'"
Kramer states that this is an area in which it is particularly hard to en-
force a tax equitably without, so to speak, prying into the secrets of the
bed chamber."' He questions whether it is worthwhile to try to collect the
tax when so many people feel there is no transfer when title to property
is changed from one spouse to the other. In smaller estates, the fifty per
cent marital deduction is frequently inadequate to provide the surviving
spouse with an adequate tax-free amount.' The Treasury bluntly states
that an especially difficult burden may be imposed by the tax when prop-
erty passes to a widow with minor children."7 The present limit on the
marital deduction has also been described as being "quite harsh when you
are dealing with people with only moderate means."...0 A 100 per cent mari-
tal deduction would provide considerable simplification in this entire area. " '
Under present law, complex dispositions are necessary in order to give
the surviving spouse the exact fifty per cent that is the maximum marital
deduction."a
The Treasury Department has provided some very interesting figures
to support its proposal of free inter-spousal transfers."' First, based on a
special study, fifty per cent of husbands with estates under $500 thousand
transferred property to their surviving spouses in amounts which exceeded
the allowable marital deduction. In contrast, only fourteen per cent of
"'. See ALI PROJECT 31-32.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2056, 2523.
" Williams, supra note 41, at 1404.
04 Casner, supra note 15, at 549.
'
0 5 See ALT PROJECT 32; Alexander, supra note 6, at 639; Kramer, supra note 71, at 11.
'0ALI PROJECT 32.
107 Kramer, supra note 71, at i1.
100 See ALT PROJECT 33.
102 TREAS. PROPOSALS 29.
110 Kramer, supra note 71, at 11.
"'. See Williams, supra note 41, at 1404.
". See ALI PROJECT 33.
"3 TREAS. PROPOSALS 111.
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husbands with estates over $1 million transferred property to their widows
in amounts exceeding the marital deduction. Thus, in the words of the
Treasury, the transfer-tax burden falls relatively more heavily on widows
who are most in need of funds to sustain themselves for the balance of
their lives. Even more interesting, however, are the figures which show,
inter alia, that ten years after the husband's death, there are, on the aver-
age, fifty-four per cent of the widows still surviving. This means that no
credit for prior transfers is possible, and that the estate, to the extent then
in existence, may be subject to double taxation."'
Arguments Against. Opponents of the tax-free, inter-spousal rule sug-
gest, on the complexity issue, that the present marital deduction rules
could be improved by amendment of the law to clarify the present areas
of controversy, and, further, that the proposed law would simply substi-
tute one set of technicalities for another."' Other opponents question
whether this gives too much of a break to married people, particularly since
our tax laws in many ways already favor the married person."' In addi-
tion, there is the problem of the revenue loss, or at least the postponement,
until, as already noted, on the average more than ten years later."7 Finally,
if special consideration is due widows with minor children or those who
receive smaller estates, an unlimited marital deduction may be an expen-
sive tool for achieving these ends. Rather, the 100 per cent rule could be
applicable only to gross estates up to a certain amount."
American Law Institute Proposal. The American Law Institute recom-
mended that the 100 per cent marital deduction be adopted in place of
the fifty per cent marital deduction, and that the terminable-interest rule
in relation to marital deduction transfers be abolished and a current-
beneficial-enjoyment test adopted."' In addition, since all of the property
transferred to the surviving spouse would be taxed in her estate at pro-
gressive rates, the American Law Institute provided for an election on the
death of the first spouse to tax part of the property in his estate. There-
after, on the death of the surviving spouse, no transfer tax would be im-
posed on identifiable previously-taxed property.'"
Casner stated that the 100 per cent marital deduction is almost essential
if the unified transfer tax were adopted, because a single, cumulative life-
time transfer tax rate might cause the surviving spouse to bear an un-
reasonable tax burden relative to lifetime donees.'2 '
Treasury Proposal. The Treasury recommends" that the 100 per cent
"
4 See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2013.
"' ALl Recommendations 120.
1'6 Kramer, supra note 71, at I 1-12.
l Westfall, supra note 12, at 997.
8ld, at 996.
"
9 ALI PROJECT 36.
'0Id. at 37.
"' ALI Recommendations 121.
'2 TREAS. PROPOSALS 29.
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marital deduction be adopted and that present restrictions upon the types
of interest which qualify for the marital deduction be liberalized. In addi-
tion, the Treasury recommends that an election be given on the death of
the first spouse to determine if the surviving spouse and/or the adminis-
trator or executor would like to have a portion of the transferred property
subject to immediate taxation so that no tax would be levied upon subse-
quent disposition by the surviving spouse.
D. Taxation of Generation Skipping
Arguments For. As noted earlier," one of the aims which Shoup ascribes
to transfer taxation is that of taxing property once a generation. Casner
has described this as the "problem of the too-infrequent impositions of
tax."'' 4 It has been said that the theoretical basis for taxing generation-
skipping transfers lies in the assumption that a tax should be imposed each
time property is transferred from one generation to another. If transfers
are not subject to taxation as they bypass each generation, then the opera-
tion of the transfer tax system is undermined."2 Under present law, suc-
cessive owners of beneficial interests for life are not regarded as having
made a transfer for transfer tax purposes unless each is given a power
deemed the equivalent of outright ownership." The Treasury in its pro-
posals is more blunt: "The enjoyment of the property by each successive
generation is not skipped-it is only the estate tax that is being skipped.' '.. 7
The wealthier the family, the greater the opportunity for use of the
generation-skipping trust."8 Evidence from a recent study indicates that
those having estates of $1 million or more make about ten times greater
use of generation-skipping trusts than those leaving estates of $300 thous-
and or less.'2" In estates of $2 million or more, almost all family trusts were
of the generation-skipping type."
Under present law, a person (not the grantor) with a life estate may
have other benefits and still keep the corpus out of his estate. Thus, in
addition to his life income interest, the life tenant can be given power to
appoint by will the property which produces the income to anyone other
than himself, his creditors, his estate, and creditors of his estate;1"' the
power to appoint such property during his lifetime to anyone other than
himself, his creditors, his estate, and creditors of his estate;"2 the power
to draw upon such property for his own benefit if the power is limited by
an ascertainable standard relating to his health, education, support, or
maintenance; " ' and the power to draw down in each calendar year the
123 See text accompanying note 36 supra.
'.. ALI PROJECT 26.
... ALI Recommendations 111-12.
121 ALl PROJECT 26.
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greater of $ 5 thousand or five per cent of such property, without regard
to any standard."M Westfall asserts that these extremely flexible trusts are
being set up not for the purpose of protecting financially inept widows,
orphans, or profligate descendants, but to ward off the federal tax col-
lector." Even though the period which such trusts may last is usually
limited by the Rule Against Perpetuities, the Rule will ordinarily permit
a trust term of eighty to 100 years.""
Finally, the indirect social costs may be as large as the taxes that the
arrangements avoid. Since trusts are noted for their conservative invest-
ment requirements, these long-term trusts tend to drain risk capital from
the economy, which could affect its continued growth and stability."' And,
since individuals must live with, pay administrative costs on, and litigate
ambiguities of expression in the work product of the original draftsman
of the trust, the benefits to the beneficiaries themselves might be out-
weighed by the problems."
Arguments Against. The opponents of taxation of generation-skipping
transfers point out that most of the proposals either impose a penalty on
the transfer or are extremely complicated.' In view of this, many transfers
in trust might be discouraged which would otherwise be established for
valid non-tax reasons.
Statistical information based upon taxable returns filed in 1959 indi-
cate that only a small proportion of revenue wealth is left in trust, and that
the revenue lost because of generation-skipping transfers is not signifi-
cant." For the taxable returns filed in 1959, there were 38,515 taxable
estates, including 1,137 millionaire decedents. The latter created only 598
trusts, and of those, only forty-eight had a duration of two generations
or more. These figures are considered typical of the extent of the problem.
Should a proposal designed to correct abuse in approximately forty-eight
estates be allowed to revolutionize the planning and administrative aspects
of the whole group of 38,515 estates, and without a significant increase
in revenue?...
In addition, opponents argue that the proposals ignore the important
differences between outright ownership of property, which they concede
should be subject to an estate tax, and beneficial enjoyment of trust prop-
erty, which traditionally has been exempt from estate taxation.14
134 1d. §§ 2041(b)(2), 2514(e).
iss Westfall, supra note 12, at 1006-07.
"soId. at 1007.
117STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM:
FACTS AND PROBLEMS 40 (Comm. Print 1964).
s See Westfall, supra note 12, at 1008. For a detailed analysis of the generation-skipping prob-
lem, see Comment, A Survey of Generation-Skipping Transfers-The Present Rule and the Possi-
bility of Reform, 22 Sw. L.J. 482 (1968).
'SoSee Comment, supra note 138, at 490.
.
4 ALI Recommendations 115.
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American Law Institute Proposal. The American Law Institute approved
resolutions which put it on record as favoring an additional tax on certain
generation-skipping transfers, but which excluded from taxation all out-
right transfers to children, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren, and all
transfers in trust for children for life, with remainder to descendants liv-
ing at the death of such children." Thus, a trust skipping one generation
(a child) would not be subject to the additional tax, while a trust skipping
two generations (a child and a grandchild) would be subject to such tax.' "
The additional tax imposed on the generation-skipping could be imposed
at the time the transfer is initially made, or at the time of the shift of
enjoyment, and an election could be given at the time of original transfer
whether to pay or defer the tax."
Treasury Proposal. The Treasury's proposal would impose a special tax
on all transfers which skip a generation. It would serve as a substitute tax
for the tax that would have been paid on the net gift by the estate of the
skipped generation. That is, if property is transferred directly to a grand-
child without passing through the child's estate, the special tax would
approximate the tax which would have been paid had it been included in
the child's estate on the transfer.'" The special tax is computed at a rate
equal to sixty per cent of the decedent's marginal rate. Sixty per cent repre-
sents the relationship between the overall effective rate and the marginal
rate on an estate. At a marginal rate of fifty per cent, the effective overall
rate is approximately thirty per cent. However, a taxpayer, at his election,
may achieve the exact result by agreeing with his child to tax the property
at the time it passes from the child to the grandchild." '
E. Taxation of Capital Gains of Assets Transferred at Death or by Gift
Arguments For. The concept of taxing capital gains at death or time
of gift is probably the most controversial reform proposal in the estate
and gift tax area. One commentator states:
It is clear . . . that the keystone of the arch of the entire plan is the novel
concept of a tax on the unrealized appreciation of property owned by a de-
cedent at the time of his death. Since the other proposals would result, ac-
cording to their proponents, in a net revenue loss, the capital gains tax
provision is necessary in order to make the reform proposals fiscally respon-
sible.""
If the capital gains proposal is indeed the keystone, it becomes necessary to
subject it to careful scrutiny.
A major argument in favor of taxing capital gains at death is the "lock-
1 3ALI PROJECT 30-31.
14 See ALl Recommendations 129.
14ALI PROJECT 29.
14TREAS. PROPOSALS 43.
141 Id. pt. 3, at 395.
14' Dane, Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reform-Some Arguments Against the Treasury Pro-
posals, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 782 (1969).
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in" argument. '49 Stated generally, the argument is that the prospect of
avoiding the gains tax by holding an appreciated asset until death dis-
torts the allocation of resources, because investments which would have
been sold are retained to secure gains tax forgiveness. It follows that if
the incentive of avoiding the gains tax were removed, the incentive for
holding appreciated assets until death would decline as the prospect of
death became greater.
The Treasury recognizes that investors become "locked-in" by the pros-
pect of avoiding income tax completely by holding appreciated assets until
death rather than selling them.1'" Yet another author, Hanrahan, asserts
that the lock-in effect results because the investor knows that there will be
an ultimate escape from the tax if he holds until death.' 1
This lock-in effect is said to curtail the essential mobility of capital in
our economy and deprive it of the fruits of an unencumbered flow of
capital toward enterprises promising the largest rewards."' Somers describes
this effect as hampering the optimum allocation of resources. 5 It has also
been described as retarding the flow of investment funds from safe ven-
tures to new and risky undertakings.1 "
Another economic effect of the lock-in problem is on market stability.
Any lock-in of assets tends to make the markets for them thinner and
thereby accentuates price fluctuations. In a period of rising prices, inves-
tors tend to hold their investments to avoid paying tax on their gains.
This, in turn, restricts supply and drives prices even higher. However,
when prices are generally falling, investors sell more readily to take de-
ductible losses and this creates an over-supply, reducing prices even lower.
Swings in market prices are thus accentuated according to the market in-
stability theory."
The taxing of capital gains at death and at time of gift may be justified
on equitable grounds as well as economic theories."' Under present law, an
investor who retains appreciated assets until death is given a tax advan-
tage over the investor who sells before he dies, since no capital gains tax
is levied on the death time transfer of the first investor and the transferee
receives a stepped-up basis on the property." ' Only an estate tax is im-
posed on the transfer at death. However, the investor who sells during life
pays a capital gains tax upon the sale, and an estate tax upon the proceeds
when he dies. This difference in treatment is a violation of horizontal
equity which requires that similarly-situated taxpayers pay similar taxes.
149 Waterbury, A Case for Realizing Gains at Death in Terms of Family Interests, 52 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 48 (1967).
"'TREAS. PROPOSALS 28. Former Secretary of the Treasury Dillon testified to this effect in
favor of the 1963 constructive realization proposal. Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54 (1963).
151 Hanrahan, A Proposal for Constructive Realization of Gains and Losses on Transfers of
Property by Gift and at Death, 15 KAN. L. REV. 133, 137 (1966).
152 TaEAS. PROPOSALS 28.
.. 'Somers, The Case for a Capital Gains Tax at Death, 52 A.B.A.J. 346-47 (1966).
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Here, although both taxpayers have accrued gains, one disposes of his
property by sale and pays a capital gains tax while the other transfers his
property at death and pays no capital gains tax on the accrued gains.
A further inequity exists since the lack of a gains tax severely curtails
the progressivity of the individual income tax. In fact, the effective tax
rate on these gains is zero. Taxing these gains at death would restore the
progressivity, if only to a limited extent.
Finally, there is the argument that the revenue loss is so large that it
simply cannot be justified. The Treasury estimates that at least fifteen
billion dollars a year of capital gains fall completely outside the income
tax system."' The taxing of these gains would add an estimated 2 billion
dollars in revenues to the federal budget.'" The proposal to tax capital
gains at death is part of the balanced revenue proposal which includes the
other estate and gift tax reform proposals. In other words, the aggregate
revenue to be collected from the estate and gift tax and the capital gain
at death proposals will roughly equal the taxes now collected under the
existing estate and gift tax systems. Therefore, to the extent that the tax
burden is increased by reason of taxing capital gains at death, it will be
reduced by the estate and gift tax proposals and the revised rate structure
which the Treasury proposes."'
Arguments Against. The most forceful argument against taxing un-
realized gains at gift and death is the severe liquidity problem it poses for
many estates. ' Wormser has argued that catastrophic, practical, and
sociological results would follow.' The impact is greatest in the estates
consisting primarily of stock in a closely-held company where the tax basis
is generally small and there has been substantial appreciation in the value
of the stock. The payment of estate taxes is already a problem in this
situation and payment of capital gains tax at death would severely aggra-
vate the problem.'"
Substantial amounts of wealth are found today in stock of closely-held
corporations since the corporate form is particularly well suited for ac-
cumulating fortunes. However, when the founders and operators of these
corporations die, the problem of liquidity to pay death taxes and adminis-
tration expenses, and even living expenses for the family, is not easily
solved."a
If stock held by an estate is actively traded, then liquidating part of it
may be comparatively easy, though the market for such property is usually
.. Holt & Shelton, The Lock-In Effect of the Capital.Gains Tax, 15 NAT'L TAX J. 337, 352
(1962).
"" TREAS. PROPOSALS 110.
X" Berkowitz, supra note 51, at 12.
' See Kurtz, supra note 55, at 461. For an extensive, detailed economic analysis of existing
unrealized appreciation in stock holdings and real estate, see Eilbott, The Revenue Gain from Taxa-
tion of Decedents' Unrealized Capital Gains, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 506 (1969); Okun, The Taxation
of Decedents' Unrealized Capital Gains, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 368 (1967).
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"1-Hanrahan, supra note 151, at 154.
161 Wormser, supra note 163, at 852.
1970]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
thin and the stock would likely have to be sold at a sacrifice price.' " On
the other hand, if the stock is not traded, the liquidity problem can result
in economic and social tragedy."7 To avoid such results, it has been noted
that prudent owners usually sell to larger corporations years before their
deaths.'" Such sellouts only fuel the highly undesirable trend toward
centralization of economic power.""s To add to the present liquidity prob-
lem the burden of further liquidation to pay a capital gains tax would
indeed create hardship. "' If two estates were of equal value but one were
composed of bonds and the other were composed of closely-held stock
which had greatly appreciated in value, the executors of each would pay
vastly different amounts of tax if a gains tax at death were in effect even
though the estates were equal in value.171
There are a number of techniques which, to some extent, could be used
to provide liquidity upon death: personal life insurance, business life in-
surance and buy-sell agreements, judicious sales of stock during life, and
the ten-year installment payment privilege under the present tax law,'"
expanded to include provisions for payment of capital gains taxes imposed
at death.
The proposed capital gains tax at death would be largely a tax on
inflation, the same as the present capital gains tax on lifetime transfers is
largely a tax on the declining purchasing power of the dollar. When the
breadwinner, typically, has been removed from the family, it becomes
even more unreasonable for the estate to pay a tax on inflation and not
real appreciation in value.'1
The proposal has the very practical difficulty of requiring a cost basis
to be established for each of the assets, including securities held by a de-
cedent for many years, and miscellaneous other items. '
Finally, a basic problem still remaining is the constitutional one. The
United States Supreme Court in Eisner v. Macomber" dealt with the tax-
ability of a common stock dividend as a distribution of earnings and
profits, but stated also that unsevered asset appreciation was not income
within the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution. This case is the bul-
wark for those who think that realization at death poses a serious sixteenth
amendment problem.' 6 Even among those who favor the taxation of capi-
tal gains at death, there is belief that the Eisner case might yet prevent the
constructive realization of capital gains at death and its taxation.' Even
though Congress may pass a statute declaring death to be a "taxable event,"
1 'eHanrahan, supra note 151, at 154.
117 Wormser, supra note 163, at 852.
8 Bosland, Has Estate Taxation Induced Recent Mergers?, 16 NAT'L TAX J. 159 (1963).
160 Hanrahan, supra note 151, at 154.
To Wormser, supra note 163, at 852.
, See Dane, supra note 148.
T
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173 See Dane, supra note 148.
'
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it is not clear whether the sixteenth amendment will permit it to stand."
However, others who favor capital gains taxation at death and time of
gift are convinced that such taxation would not be unconstitutional.
Hanrahan has stated that the constitutionality of taxing unrealized appre-
ciation at time of gift or at death is reasonably certain.'"m Both Hanrahan
in his article and Waterbury in his article have listed cases subsequent to
Eisner which they contend have modified its holding to such an extent that
no constitutional bar against taxation now exists.'se
In support of the constitutionality of President Kennedy's proposal,
Secretary of Treasury Dillon submitted an opinion to the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means prepared by the General Counsel of the Trea-
sury.' The opinion points out what the writers above pointed out: that
federal courts have given a liberal construction to the Congressional power
to tax by recognizing its broad discretion to define income. The opinion,
after referring to the Eisner decision, stated:
Later Supreme Court cases have so modified and qualified its concepts that
there is every probability that the Supreme Court will now recognize power
in Congress to tax appreciation in value as income at appropriate times....
The proposed legislation is not inconsistent with the foregoing definition as
it proposes to tax as income 'something of exchangeable value' that is 'drawn
by' the taxpayer for his 'disposal.' The increase in value, having an exchange-
able value, would be disposed of by the taxpayer according to his wishes to
accomplish his economic objectives.'
To some extent, the increase of the maximum capital gains rate by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 might be said to militate against taxing capital
gains at death since the total impact at such time would be even greater
than when the proposals were first presented to Congress.
Finally, it might be argued that realization of gain at death or gift is
objectionable since there is a reasonable alternative, i.e., a carry-over of
basis approach similar to that now used for transfers by gift.'a Heirs would
refer to the basis which the decedent had in computing their gain or loss
on disposition of the assets. This approach is worth considering since it
178 Id.
' Hanrahan, supra note 151, at 155.
180 Some of these cases in which courts have found the existence of income, though in the sense
of the Eisner dicta the taxpayer would be considered as receiving nothing, include United States
v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (transfer of appreciated shares for release of marital claims); Hel-
vering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (father taxed on gift of interest coupons to son); Helver-
ing v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940) (assignment of renewal commissions); United States v. Gen-
eral Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961) (contributions
of appreciated assets to a pension trust); International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135
F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943) (transfer of appreciated shares to employees as a bonus); Commissioner
v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642 (2d Cir.)," cert. denied, 319 U.S. 714 (1942) (transfer of appreciated
securities pursuant to divorce decree); Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1941) (transfer of appreciated stock pursuant to divorce settlement).
181 Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 592-98 (1963).
'Id. at 593. In a closely related matter, Lewis Del Cotto in Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity as
Income: The Constitutional Problem of Taxing Gifts and Bequests as Income, 23 TAx L. REV.
231, 256 (1968), concludes that there is no constitutional inhibition from taxing the entire re-
ceipt as income to the recipient.
' Marshall & Crumbley, Reform Proposals for Taxation of Capital Gains-Some Alternate
Suggestions, 108 TRUSTS & ESTATES 871, 878 (1969).
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was substituted for the Kennedy proposal for constructive realization in
the Revenue Act of 1963 by the House Ways and Means Committee.5 4
The Committee later eliminated this section entirely from the tax bill. The
carry-over basis approach would completely avoid the constitutional ques-
tion and eliminate the liquidity problem that would be caused by the
capital gains proposal. It would remove the incentive to hold appreciated
property until death in order to avoid completely the capital gains tax
and this would diminish the lock-in effect on investments.
American Law Institute Proposal. Although there was fairly extensive
discussion, proposals relating to taxation of appreciation at death and gift
and/or the basis problem only produced disagreement. Casner concluded
that: "[B]ecause of the deeply felt differences of opinion on the basis
problem, no position in this regard will be taken in the American Law
Institute's Estate and Gift Tax Project." '
Treasury Proposal. The Treasury has proposed to treat a transfer by gift
or bequest as the equivalent of a sale and tax appreciation in value under
the income tax provisions." However, only the appreciation which oc-
curred after the day of enactment of the law would be subject to tax.
The tax on the appreciation of assets would be allowed as an estate tax de-
duction. Therefore, the amount of the tax would not be included in the
decedent's gross estate, the same as with taxpayers who realize their gains
prior to their deaths.
There would be a minimum basis of $60 thousand permitted for all
taxpayers so that no gains tax would be payable on assets transferred where
the total value were $60 thousand or less.
On transfers between spouses or to a charitable organization there would
be a complete exemption from the tax. In addition, there would be a
limited exemption for transfers to orphan children who were minors and
for transfers of household goods and personal effects.
Unrealized losses and unrealized gains would be permitted to offset each
other and, in addition, any net unrealized losses would be permitted to
apply against capital gains for the three taxable years prior to the de-
cedent's final income tax return. The unrealized losses could also be offset
against ordinary income, subject to the usual limitations.
Finally, gains on transferred assets would become eligible for income-
averaging in the year of the decedent's death.
F. Accessions Tax
Description. Because of the unique features of the accessions tax, a brief
description of it would be in order before discussing the pros and cons.
Accessions are defined as including all property received by way of in-
184 Id.
185 Casner, supra note 15, at 583.
SFor a discussion of the Treasury proposals, see TREAS. PROPOSALS 29; Andresen, supra note
98, at 667; Berkowitz, supra note 51, at 12-13.
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heritance or gift." ' An accessions tax, therefore, is an excise tax on the
transfer of property at death or by gift, but one which is measured by
the amount of property received by each recipient rather than the total
amount transferred.1"' The accessions tax has been called a sort of combi-
nation income and inheritance tax." It is like a special income tax because
it is measured by the total gifts and inheritances received during a life-
time. It is also like an inheritance tax because it is imposed on recipients
rather that transferors. However, unlike an inheritance tax, the amount
of the accessions tax is determined by the total received from all sources,
which is accumulated to find the rate applicable to the current amount
received. Thus, an accessions tax may bear more heavily than a transferor
tax in the case of a single person inheriting from several sources, while it
will bear less heavily when a single estate is divided among several recipients
without accessions from other sources.
With one major exception, property which is taxed under the unified
transfer tax is the same as that which would be taxed under the accessions
tax proposal. The major exception is a transfer in trust, which is not
deemed received by the transferee upon creation of a trust, but only upon
receiving distribution from it, whether of income or corpus."' Because of
this deferral in tax, a typical accessions tax proposal includes a separate
tax on property left in trust where significant amounts are left therein."'
Arguments For. Many feel that an accessions tax system would be the
most equitable type of transfer tax system possible on the theory that it is
fairer to impose a lower rate of tax on property which is transferred to
three children of a decedent than it is on property which is transferred to
only one child of a decedent. 2 Also, large inheritances received from others
would be taken into account in determining the tax rate to be applied.'
Shoup takes the position that transferee graduation is preferable because it
is transferees who bear the burden of the tax in any event, no matter how
it is graduated."'
Since the rate of tax would depend upon all lifetime accessions to the
recipient, the system would encourage the spreading of wealth among a
number of people and result in a wider distribution of wealth." If this
redistribution did not occur voluntarily, the relatively higher tax for dis-
tribution to fewer individuals would help achieve the goal of breaking
down concentrations of wealth.
The accessions tax would eliminate many of the complex problems of
trust taxation under our present system of transferor taxation.'" However,
1"7 Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAx L. REV. 589, 591 (1967).
8'Id. at 589.
189 Kramer, supra note 71, at 13.
"..Andrews, supra note 187, at 591-92.
" Id. at 593.
"' Alexander, supra note 6, at 651.
"9 C. SHOUp, supra note 1, at 29-31.
'4id. at 31.
19 Alexander, supra note 6, at 653.
1' ALI PROJECT 450.
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in their place would be the problem of the penalty tax on large transfers
in trust in order to keep trustees from avoiding the accessions tax by ac-
cumulating trust property.
Provisions for splitting of gifts between husband and wife would no
longer be needed," 7 and the whole problem of contemplation of death and
dual taxation of certain incomplete gifts would be eliminated, although
these could also be eliminated in large part under a unified transfer tax
system as presently proposed."8
Arguments Against. Since the accessions tax system would represent such
a drastic departure from our present system, there would have to be a
complete re-education of the experts and the public, and a careful re-
consideration of all existing estate plans.'" The accessions tax system
would be more difficult to administer since a great many more returns
would need to be filed and processed.' Not only would each person who
received property under an estate have to file an accessions tax return, but
whenever distributions were received from a trust, the beneficiary would
have to file a return."' Careful record keeping of prior accessions would
be a necessity.
It is sometimes asserted that an accessions tax would produce less revenue
than a transferor tax since the property is scattered among more individ-
uals, and, therefore, it would produce a lower overall effective rate under
a progressive rate schedule.' Also, if gifts were made directly to grand-
children rather than children, there would be generation-skipping trans-
fers which would represent a serious erosion of the transfer tax base.
Finally, probably the most repeated criticism of the accessions tax
proposal is that the provisions for taxing trust transfers are too complex."0'
Since it is proposed that no accession be recognized upon the creation of a
trust, and that a beneficiary be deemed to have an accession only upon
receipt of property from the trust by way of distribution, an additional
trust penalty imposed on its creation would have to be implemented, at
least on the larger trusts. In addition to the complexity, there would be
a considerable deferral of tax and consequent loss of revenue.
American Law Institute Proposal. Although the Associate Reporter,
William D. Andrews, of the American Law Institute Estate and Gift Tax
Project, prepared several drafts of an accessions tax proposal, it was never
voted upon among either the consultants, the tax advisory group, or the
Institute as a whole.' It was felt that there was a lot of informing and
educating to do before an accessions tax could be made publicly and




20 Alexander, supra note 6, at 655.
2°1ALI PROJECT 454-55.




politically acceptable, and, further, it did not want such a tax to stand
in the way of presently attainable reforms in transferor taxation, includ-
ing the unification of the present gift and estate taxes.'
The draft prepared by Andrews levied an accessions tax on any person
receiving property by way of inter vivos gift or death time transfer. A
small annual exclusion would be allowed for outright gifts during life,
and no tax would be payable until a taxpayer received accessions in excess
of $24 thousand."5 All prior accessions would be taken into account in
determining the rate and tax on the current accession. In addition, many
of the concepts developed in the unified tax proposal were incorporated
into the accessions tax proposal, such as the tax-free inter-spousal transfer
rule. As previously mentioned, the gift-splitting provision would not be
applicable under an accessions tax system. Accessions from parents, parents-
in-law, parents of a deceased parent, children and siblings were given
favored treatment in the form of a deduction of forty per cent from the
amount of property received.
A trust was not treated as having an accession upon transfer of property
to it, but, rather, upon distribution of income or corpus to the beneficiary.
An additional penalty tax would be imposed on property included in trust
if the value of property placed in trust were at least $100 thousand, or if
the entire estate of the decedent disposed of at death exceeded $500 thous-
and.
Treasury Proposal. The Treasury Department has made no proposal for
change to an accessions tax system.
G. Canadian Royal Tax Commission Proposal
General Description. The publishing by the Royal Commission on Taxa-
tion in Canada of its report on tax reform coincides with a time when there
is careful consideration of estate and gift tax reform in this country." '
The thrust of the Commission's recommendations is to tax gifts and in-
heritances as income in much the same manner as salary income, dividends,
and other familiar taxable income items are taxed, without allowing the
donor or the decedent's estate a deduction for any of the amount trans-
ferred. The estate and gift tax laws would be repealed, and gifts and be-
quests would be taxed as ordinary income to the recipient, with the top
bracket in the income tax equal to fifty per cent.
Under the proposal, the individual would be replaced by the family as
the fundamental accounting unit for income taxation. It is proposed that
gifts and inheritances within the family tax unit be completely exempt
205 Id. at 447.
206 Alexander, supra note 6, at 650-51.
207 The recommendations of the Canadian Royal Tax Commission concerning gifts and inheri-
tances can be found in 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMM'N ON TAXATION chs. 10, 17 (1966).
For a discussion of these recommendations, see Goodman, Royal Commission Would Tax as Income
Gifts and Inheritances of Canadians, 26 J. TAXATION 370, 371-72 (1967); Kramer, supra note
71, at 14; Jantscher, Death and Gift Taxation in the United States After the Report of the Royal
Commission, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 121 (1969).
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from tax. Accordingly, where children received gifts or inheritances from
their parents, the transfers would not be subject to taxation, and if the
child were a minor and the money were used for his maintenance, no tax
would ever become payable. Upon leaving the family, however, the chil-
dren would be taxed on the value of the assets which they took with them
as if it were income received at that time, and an exemption of $ 5 thousand
would be allowed. In many cases, therefore, the tax forgiveness on the
transfer would merely be a tax deferral until the children became adults.
In addition to taxing as income the receipt of property, the Royal Com-
mission proposes that capital gains be taxed upon the transfer, thus placing
a substantial tax burden on even relatively modest estates. For example,
on a $100 thousand estate, the overall effective tax rate for both the
capital gains and the income tax could easily be forty per cent.
To alleviate some of the tax burden of the new system, the Commission
also proposes that the maximum, marginal personal income tax rate be
fifty per cent and some liberal income averaging provisions be enacted.
Relationship to United States Proposals. The feeling has been expressed
that although many of the Commission's recommendations in other areas
have been accepted as valid,
The income-inheritance tax that they recommend does not appear to be a
promising alternative to the existing U.S. Federal estate tax. Where our estate
tax is most deeply flawed and needs amendment most, the income-inheritance
tax generally does not provide a more attractive tax result than an amended
estate tax would.08
The problems in taxing transfers in trust and generation-skipping trans-
fers, which exist under an accessions tax proposal, exist also under the
Commission's proposal to tax receipts as income.' In addition, to impose
an income tax on transfers by gifts and at death would be to compound the
present inequities, or, at least, the varying treatments, existing in the
present income tax law to these receipts."' In any event, the study of the
Canadians' approach to tax problems which are basically similar to ours is
enlightening and will serve as a basis of comparison for United States
reform.
III. CONCLUSION
Analysis of reform in the estate and gift tax area is different from that
in the income tax area. In the latter, proponents of the comprehensive
tax base stand ready with a normative theory of income to which many
preferences, loopholes, or exceptions can be compared and thereby evalu-
ated.21 Unfortunately, no such theoretical model can be used to direct our
208 Jantscher, supra note 207, at 137.
209 Id.
210 id.
211 See generally the incisive analysis contained in the debate between Bittker, Musgrave, Pech-
man, and Galvin, in Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARv. L. REv. 44
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footsteps in the area of estate and gift tax reform, apart from the concept
of treating all receipts as income. The approach is ad hoc, and the policy
considerations of the major reform proposals have been discussed in this
Article. Fortunately, we do have the brilliant and thorough examination
of the entire area by the American Law Institute's Estate and Gift Tax
Project. With this type of analysis and dedication, a greater understanding
of the entire area has been achieved and estate and gift tax reform can
move equitably and effectively forward. Eisenstein stated in his article in
1956: "The estate tax, I believe, is in a period of decline." 12 Recent events
convince this writer that the decline is at an end, and that substantial
reform is appearing on the horizon.
(1967); Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARv. L. REv. 63 (1967);
Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The Practicalities of Tax Reform
and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1016 (1968); Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation:
A Response, 81 l-Luv. L. REv. 1032 (1968).
212 Eisenstein, supra note 28, at 255.
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